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U. S. v. PARCELS OF LAND

rule set forth above should properly be applied. It is submitted that the instant case is an intelligent extension of
the rule of damages for breach of contract into the field
of insurance. The insurance company, dealing as it did
in risks and legal liabilities of others assumed by contract,
was certainly most fully aware that on its failure to perform the obligations required by the liability insurance
policy some loss might be suffered by the insured. And,
where the insured is an interstate trucker what action is
more to be supposed probable than an attachment proceeding against the one thing of value which is in the
grasp of the injured party? Such a loss following the
breach of contract by the defendant company is certainly
one of the results "arising naturally" out of the breach of
contract, and by application of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale would make the defendant company liable for the
entire loss sustained.

VALUE OF WIFE'S INCHOATE DOWER IN
CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, Etc.'
In a Federal land condemnation proceeding, the question arose as to whether the owner's wife is entitled to
any of the damages awarded her husband, for destruction
of her inchoate right of dower. The question generally
does not arise, because checks for payment of such damages are usually made payable to husband and wife jointly.
Here the problem arose because the wife, who was in
Greece, had given her husband a very broad power of
attorney; but a Treasury regulation, as construed, prohibited the receipt of any moneys by a husband as the
wife's agent. On the basis of Federal cases, 2 the District
Court felt that it was obliged to decide this case according to Maryland law. The Court concluded that, under
the Maryland law, the wife's inchoate dower could not
be valued and so, in the principal case, nothing had to be
withheld for the wife's protection.
146 F. Supp. 441 (D. C. Md., 1942).

Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. R. Co., 258 U. S. 314 (1922) ; Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
2
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The decision as to the Maryland law was not an easy
one. The statutory law offered no solution.3 There were
two opposing nisi prius decisions on the precise point in
question. In Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Smith,4
where land had been condemned by the railroad, the jury
had not assessed damages for the inchoate dower of a
Mrs. Taylor. Judge Harlan decided that dower was not
such an interest as to be capable of assessment, and the
award "ought not be disturbed because the whole of the
value of the rent incident to reversion in fee was assessed
to the husband." In the other case,5 Judge Stockbridge
found the wife not to be an improper party to the proceedings because her inchoate dower was "a matter for
estimation by the jury; it may be a nominal value of $1,
at the same time it is a right the jury must take into consideration, and in any apportionment for damages make
their estimate on it."
Except for these lower court decisions, there were no
authorities directly in point. Certain early partition
cases 6 indicated the possibility of an allowance in an appropriate case; but this was met by strong language in
the case of Reiff v. Horst. After pointing out that the
interest of the wife was inchoate only during the husband's lifetime, could not be pledged, mortgaged, assigned, or sold, but only released to the owner of the fee,
the Maryland Court concluded: "Regarding her right,
as the law does, during the husband's life, as having no
present value, as it is not the subject of sale, but only of
8Md. Code (1939) Art. 33A, Sec. 1, providing for petitions in condemnation proceedings to be filed against husbands and wives of married owners
was construed to be only a procedural provision. Md. Code (1939) Art. 16,
Sec. 48, providing for sale of lands free from any claim of dower and an
award from one-seventh to one-tenth in proceeds of sale refers only to
consummate dower.
' Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Smith, 1 Baltimore City Reports
99 (1890).
5Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Textor, 2 Baltimore City Reports
(1905).
'Warren v. Twilley, 10 Md. 39 (1856) ; and Rowland v. Prather, 53 Md.
232 (1880).
7 55 Md. 42, 49 (1880). The facts of the case were: Abraham Horst
and wife, Anna, executed several mortgages on real property and afterwards united in a deed of trust of all property, personal and real, for
benefit of creditors. This provided for payment to Anna, in consideration
of her uniting in the deed, one-twelfth of gross proceeds of sale in lieu
of her contingent right of dower. The Court discussed the nature of
dower and decided that there was no standard for ascertaining its worth,
but concluded that the wife should be allowed part of the proceeds "as a
consideration for her release of expectant right in the parcel. Though not
the subject of a grant, her right, peculiar as is its character, is the subject
of contract for release."
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release to the owner of the fee, we have no scale or standard for ascertaining its present worth." This language
was approved in a later Maryland decision,' and had been
the basis of the Federal court's earlier refusal to value
dower in a gift taxation case. 9 From it, the Court reasoned, in the instant case, that even though the Maryland
law would protect the wife's inchoate dower as against
the husband in the distribution of damages; still, the
Maryland rule of valuation was that there was "no scale
or standard for ascertaining its present worth." Hence
the wife would be entitled to no portion of the damages
awarded her husband.
Cases elsewhere deciding this point have reached different results, the majority holding the wife is not entitled to compensation for destruction of her inchoate
dower, and a strong and persistent minority holding the
opposite view. The majority view has been stated to be
that "Dower exists in the fund resulting from land taken
by eminent domain proceeding after death of the husband
but not as to the proceeds of the land taken in his lifetime . . ."' This is based on reasoning that public interest requires dower to be extinguished when the land is
taken by right of eminent domain, and since it does not
rise to the dignity of a vested property interest it can be
taken without due process of law. The interest of the
wife is only inchoate during the husband's lifetime and
cannot be assigned, granted, mortgaged or pledged, and
the only thing which the wife can do with it is release to
the owner of the fee.
The view of the minority has been stated to be that
"though she has no actual estate in dower during the life
of her husband, yet she has an interest and a right of
which she could not be divested but by her consent," or
'Roth v. Roth, 144 Md. 553, 555, 125 A. 400 (1923). Here the effect of the
Court's decree was to protect the wife's right when the husband sought
to sell the land free from the wife's claim of dower by having court appoint a trustee for the dower interest of the wife, the trustee to be directed
to join in sale of the property. Yet, in the principal case, which also relied
on the Reiff case, the effect was not to protect the wife's interest.
'Hopkins v. Magruder, Collector, 34 F. Supp. 381 (D. C. Md., 1940),
noted (1942) 6 Md. L. Rev. 167.
10 28 C. J. S. 49.
"In Roth v. Roth, 144 Md. 553, 555, 125 A. 400 (1923) the Court used
the following language: "The marital interest (dower) which is sought
to be made the subject of a judicial sale in this case is one of which the
wife cannot be divested without her consent ;" and also, quoting an earlier
case, "a sale cannot be made without her concurrence . . . and she cannot
be coerced."
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crime, or her dying before her husband.' 2 This is a
valuable interest, affects marketability of title, entitles
the wife to redeem from a mortgage, is not subjected to
claims of husband's creditors, is a good consideration for
a promise, cannot be defeated by sale of husband's trustee's in bankruptcy, and so should not be completely destroyed by ignoring all possibility of her survival of her
husband.
Courts following the majority view speak of the wife's
right as being only a contingent possibility of interest
which can neither be the subject of a grant nor assignment, but only of release to the owner of the fee, and so
should not be protected in such a case as the principal
one. But, in a condemnation case the wife is neither assigning nor granting; she is being forced to release.
Should not the law protect her and give her a portion of
the proceeds?
Although the Maryland Court in the Reiff case states
that there is no standard for determining present value,
other courts have found no insurmountable difficulty in
determining the present value of a wife's inchoate dower.
One way is to ascertain the present value of an annuity for
the life of the wife, equal to the interest in one-third of
the proceeds of the estate to which the right attaches, and
then deduct from this the value of a similar annuity dependent upon the joint lives of the husband and wife. 3
Some cases add*that, in applying this, a proper regard
-should be had to the value
of the property, and the health,
4
and ages of the parties.'
Cases which are in accord with the principal one often
give as another reason for refusing the wife any part of
the damages awarded, that to do so overlooks the possibility that the husband might survive the wife15 and denies
the husband full use of his property to which he is entitled.
Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533 (Mass., 1829).
Shaw v. Trickle, 183 Wis. 1, 197 N. W. 329 (1924); Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige 386 (N. Y., 1839); Doty v. Baker, 11 Hun. 222 (N. Y.,
1877) ; Brown v. Brown, 94 S. C. 492 (1913) ; Strayer v. Long, 86 Va. 557,
10 S. E. 574 (1890) ; Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa 259 (1876) ; Lancaster v.
Lancaster, 78 Ky. 198 (1879); Grayson v. Grayson, 190 S. W. 930 (Mo.,
1916) ; Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533 (Mass., 1829) ; Gore v. Townsend,
105 N. C. 228, 11 S. E. 160 (1890), see note, 34 A. L. R. 1021.
14 Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232 (1883).
"Long v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N. E. 161 (1919) : "As her interest
in the realty was 'inchoate' . . . so when this real estate was converted
to personalty her right therein was still 'inchoate' . . . she did not have
a present right to possess it, to seize it, and to use it, because it was
still conditioned upon her survivorship, the same as her interest in any
other personalty of the husband."
"

13
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This is an unavoidable criticism of cases which give the
wife a lump sum from the award. But it is equally true
that by refusing to give the wife anything a court overlooks the possibility of the wife's survivorship.
It seems that the approach of a New York court would
be more just in avoiding the absolute character of the
"lump sum or nothing approach." In In Re Cropsey Ave, 6
the court created a trust in one-third of the damages
awarded (less liens) which was invested, and the income
paid to the husband during his life and thereafter to his
wife, if she survived, during her life. This protected the
inchoate dower right and yet assured the husband of the
enjoyment of his property until death. It is difficult to
find any theoretical unfairness in this approach. 7 This
could be followed in a jurisdiction which, like Maryland in
the Reiff case, finds it impossible to find a standard for
ascertaining the present worth of dower.
The best way to approach the question would seem to
be to consider what is the policy of the law in relation to
inchoate dower elsewhere. The law has always favored
dower; it has been said ". . . the tenant in dower is so
much favored, as that it is the common byword in the law,
that the law favored three things: 1-Life; 2-Liberty;
3-Dower."''
Elsewhere the law protects dower, will not
allow a husband to defeat it by conveyance, and will not
allow it to be defeated by a sale by the husband's trustees
in bankruptcy or subjected to levy and execution.
Since dower is so protected elsewhere, and other similar
interests are protected in condemnation proceedings, 9
there seems to be no just reason for refusing protection for
the wife's right of inchoate dower in a condemnation proceeding. In the absence of direct Maryland holding, it
would seem to be the better policy for a Federal court to
find the Maryland law to be what the court feels it should
"0268 N. Y. 183, 197 N. E. 189 (1935). A similar approach has been
taken, where damages awarded in condemnation proceeding were substituted for the land in case of a mortgage, In Re Neptune Ave., City of New
York, 271 N. Y. 331, 3 N. E. (2d) 445, 446 (1936) ; and in case of right of
survivorship in land held by tenant in entirety. In Re Jamaica Bay, 252
App. Div. 103, 297 N. Y. S. 415 (1937).
17 This might, however, be impractical in cases wflere only a small
amount of money is involved, or where, as in the principal case, the husband needed it to buy new property to carry on his restaurant business.
" BACON, STATUTE OF USES 37.
19
Mortgagees: City of Birmingham v. Edmond, 134 So. 622 (1931); In
Re Forman, 138 Misc. 502, 240 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1930).
Lessee8: Clark v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 337 (1929) ; Wren v. Smith,
41 F. (2d) 972 (Ct. of App. D. C., 1930).
Vendee: Cullen v. Bender, 122 Ohio St. 82, 170 N. E. 633 (1930).

268

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

be. The instant opinion states that it was the judge's duty
"to determine what the state law is, not what it ought
to be."
This gives the impression, when taken along with the
rest of the opinion, that the judge's feeling was that the
Maryland Court of Appeals, if faced with the problem,
would adopt as its view what was not the most socially
desirable result, although such result is accepted by decisions elsewhere. Quaere might be raised as to whether
this was either a wise or a necessary approach. Should
not a Federal court, in seeking to discover unsettled state
law, assume that the state court would do what it should
do?

